Chinese Military Analysts Warn PLA Must Rethink Taiwan Operations Under US and Japan Surveillance

Chinese military analysts say the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) faces a new operational reality after its December 29 drills around Taiwan triggered an immediate US and Japanese response. The two-day exercise, dubbed Justice Mission 2025, showed that avoiding detection is no longer realistic in a region saturated with advanced surveillance aircraft, drones, and satellites.

The message from analysts is blunt: the PLA must learn how to fight while being watched.

The warning comes from a report by Beijing-based defence think tank Lande, which examined the PLA’s latest large-scale drills around Taiwan. The exercise was launched without public warning, yet surveillance assets from the United States and Japan were already repositioning within hours, according to the report, as reported by South China Morning Post.

That rapid response, analysts say, exposed just how permanent and layered foreign monitoring has become in the Taiwan Strait.

According to Lande, when the PLA began its two-day exercise on December 29, US and Japanese surveillance aircraft either diverted from routine patrols or flew directly toward the drill zones. Among the aircraft identified were the US MQ-4C Triton drone and Japan’s Falcon 2000MSA surveillance plane, tracked using open-source flight path data, reported SCMP.

The report noted a sudden spike in sensor data transmissions as the aircraft approached the exercise area. While the think tank did not specify the exact source of the data, it concluded that the response was anything but improvised. “The entire process was not an ad hoc decision,” the report said, suggesting a pre-established emergency protocol had been activated.

For analysts, this points to what they describe as multi-dimensional surveillance—a web of airborne sensors, satellites, radar systems, and data links that leaves little room for surprise. If the PLA’s goal is to launch a rapid or unexpected operation across the strait, that reality must now be baked into planning.

The think tank’s core recommendation is a shift in mindset. Instead of focusing on hiding movements, the PLA should prioritise guaranteeing mission effectiveness even after detection. That would involve faster manoeuvring, tighter information control, and what the report called systemic resilience under constant observation.

Technically, the report suggested that advanced US systems such as the AN/ZPY-3 radar carried by the MQ-4C could be countered using integrated electronic warfare tools capable of scanning, jamming, and deception. It also floated the idea of a controlled release of information, deliberately shaping what adversaries believe they are seeing.

Other analysts echoed that view, noting that counter-surveillance could include electronic jamming or intercepting sonobuoys—sonar devices dropped by aircraft to track submarines—according to SCMP.

Song Zhongping, a military analyst and former PLA instructor, said the deeper challenge lies not just in aircraft or bases, but in the vast US data transmission network spanning the Pacific. While Kadena Air Base in Okinawa is a critical intelligence hub, he noted that much of the data flow relies on satellites rather than a single fixed location.

“They can route data to Guam, or even back to the US mainland,” Song Zhongping said, highlighting the difficulty of disrupting such a distributed system.The Lande report acknowledged that bases such as Kadena and Naha Air Base in Okinawa could be vulnerable to strikes. But analysts cautioned that targeting facilities alone would not cripple surveillance.

Yue Gang, a retired PLA colonel and military commentator, said the US and Japanese response to the drills was likely just the first phase of a contingency plan. In a prolonged exercise—or an actual conflict—Washington could rapidly deploy additional assets, creating an even denser reconnaissance network.

“After a day or two, they could mobilise their full range of resources,” Yue Gang said, adding that data collected in Okinawa could be relayed to Yokosuka, home to the US Navy’s Seventh Fleet, or to US Indo-Pacific Command in Honolulu.Yue argued that the PLA could still “create obstacles” for intelligence gathering, but any move to strike satellites or facilities would depend heavily on how far a conflict escalated.

The strategic stakes are high. Beijing views Taiwan as part of China and has increased military pressure since pro-independence leader William Lai Ching-te took office in 2024. Tensions surged further after Washington approved an US$11.1 billion arms sale to Taiwan—the largest on record—and after Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi suggested Japan might intervene militarily in a Taiwan conflict.

Against that backdrop, analysts say the lesson from Justice Mission 2025 is clear: in a region under constant watch, the real challenge is no longer staying invisible, but staying effective once seen.